Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Alternativ können Sie versuchen, selbst über Ihren lokalen Bibliothekskatalog auf das gewünschte Dokument zuzugreifen.
Bei Zugriffsproblemen kontaktieren Sie uns gern.
13 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Dimensions of philosophy series
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 21-51
ISSN: 1471-6437
There is a traditional understanding of what morality is, an under-standing that most contemporary moral philosophers take for granted. This understanding is not itself a theory, but rather an account of the phenomenon of morality, to which these philosophers have thought any theory of the phenomenon must conform if it is to be considered successful as either an explanation or a justification of our moral life. According to this account, there are three prominent features that, together, characterize the moral:First, moral action and moral regard are taken to be other-regarding. While some philosophers have identified a certain kind of self-respect as part of morality, in general morality has been thought to involve duties to others, requiring that they be treated with respect. Self-interest is generally taken to be outside the province of the moral.
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 135-165
ISSN: 1471-6437
The biggest danger, that of losing oneself, can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to be noticed.Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 112-115
ISSN: 1552-7476
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 1-28
ISSN: 1471-6437
Accusing, condemning, and avenging are part of our daily life. However, a review of many years of literature attempting to analyze our blaming practices suggests that we do not understand very well what we are doing when we judge people culpable for a wrong they have committed. Of course, everyone agrees that, for example, someone deserves censure and punishment when she is guilty of a wrong, and the law has traditionally looked for a mens rea, or "guilty mind," in order to convict someone of a criminal wrongdoing. But philosophers and legal theorists have found it interestingly difficult to say what mens rea is. For example, noting the way in which we intuitively think people aren't culpable for a crime if they disobey the law by mistake, or under duress, or while insane, theorists such as H.L.A. Hart have tried to define mens rea negatively, as that which an agent has if he is not in what we consider to be an excusing state. But such an approach only circumscribes and does not unravel the central mystery; it also fails to explain why the law recognizes any excusing states as mitigating or absolving one of guilt, much less why all and only the excusing states that are recognized by the law are the right ones. Moreover, the Model Penal Code, which gives a very detailed account of the kinds of mental states which justify criminal conviction, does not tell us (nor was it designed to tell us) why these states of mind (e.g., knowledge, purposiveness, intention, assumption of risk of harm, negligence) are relevant to an assessment of legal guilt.
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 22-44
ISSN: 1471-6437
This article is concerned with the nature of individual moral failure. This has not been a standard issue for exploration in moral philosophy, where questions surrounding moral success have been more popular: in particular, the questions "What is it to do the moral thing (i.e., how do I identify moral success)?" and "Why am I supposed to do the moral thing (i.e., what is morality's authority)?" I want to change the subject and pursue answers to three importantly related questions about people's failure to be moral.First, I want to explore an issue in moral psychology: why do people behave immorally? I suspect this question has been largely ignored by philosophers because they have thought it a question for psychologists, and one that, at any rate, has an easy surface answer. Isn't it our immorality simply the result of our excessive self-interest? Yet we shall see in what follows that this answer is not nearly good enough, and that philosophers have a lot to contribute in determining what would count as a satisfactory answer. We shall also see that different meta-ethical theories purporting to explain the authority of moral action implicitly assume different and often mutually inconsistent accounts of why (and when) we fail to be moral, and our analysis will show that none of these accounts of moral failure is unproblematic.
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 208
ISSN: 0048-3915
In: Cambridge studies in philosophy and law
This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalised in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: when, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require - both conceptually and morally - the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy indeed are moral virtues, what role, if any, should they play in the law?
In: Feminist Constructions
The essays in this volume present versions of feminism that are explicitly liberal, or versions of liberalism that are explicitly feminist. By bringing together some of the most respected and well-known scholars in mainstream political philosophy today, Amy R. Baehr challenges the reader to reconsider the dominant view that liberalism and feminism are 'incompatible.'
In: Philosophy and Public Affairs Readers 2
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Introduction -- PART I. JUSTIFICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT -- Marxism and Retribution -- The Paradox of Punishment -- The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish -- A Consensual Theory of Punishment -- The Moral Education Theory of Punishment -- PART II. PROBLEMS OF PUNISHMENT -- Equity and Mercy -- Harm and Retribution -- Locke and the Right to Punish -- PART III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT -- Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form -- Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag -- Does It Matter if the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered? -- Refuting Reiman and Nathanson